With abbreviated abstracts.
12. "Perceptual rationality," Acta Analytica, forthcoming: Taking inspiration from Susanna Siegel, I provide a new argument that perceptual experiences can be rational or irrational.
11. Review of Michael Madary's Visual Phenomenology, Philosophical Review, 2019: Madary holds that vision is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. I find this thesis to be a promising one.
10. "Phenomenal, normative, and other explanatory gaps: A general diagnosis," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2017/2019 (online/print): I suggest that certain anti-reductivist arguments - about consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more - can be fitted to a common template. I then offer a general, reductivist-friendly response to all arguments fitting that template.
9. "Can grounding characterize fundamentality?," Analysis, 2017: For all that has been said so far - yes.
8. "On the generality of experience," with co-author Todd Ganson, Philosophical Studies, 2016: In my (2014), I argue that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. Craig French and Anil Gomes (2015) criticize those arguments. Here Todd Ganson and I rebut their criticisms.
7. "Knowledge and other norms for assertion, action, and belief," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015/2016 (online/print): I advance a unified and knowledge-centered account of the structure of epistemic normativity. It is far superior to extant knowledge-centered accounts primarily because of its fierce pluralism about epistemic norms.
6. “The limited role of particulars in phenomenal experience,” Journal of Philosophy, 2014: I argue that external particulars are sometimes parts of experience but are never parts of phenomenal character.
5. “Beyond transparency: the spatial argument for experiential externalism,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013: I argue from the premise that all experiences have a pervasively spatial character to the conclusion that phenomenal character sometimes, and perhaps almost always, consists of properties external to the subject.
4. “Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?,” Philosophical Studies, 2013: There is not.
3. “How to explain the explanatory gap,” Dialectica, 2013: Grant that there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal. The best explanation, I argue, is that our phenomenal concepts are semantically basic. This result squares better with physicalism than anti-physicalism.
2. “General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach,” with George Mashour (neuroscientist/anesthesiologist) as second author, Frontiers in Consciousness Research, 2013: Divide the problem of consciousness in two: what makes a state conscious at all, and what gives a state its specific phenomenal character? We argue that neuroscientific data best support the first-order representationalist's answers to these questions.
1. “Exploring subjective representationalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2012: I exhibit several advantages of the view that experiences represent some mind-dependent properties over the view that they exclusively represent mind-independent properties.
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9. "The geometry problem for naive realism." Seeing a circle puts you in a position to form the concept of a circle. I argue that naive realists cannot explain how this is possible.
8. "Perceptual rationality." Susanna Siegel argues that perceptual experiences can be rational or irrational. I improve on her argument.
7. "A solution to the problem of hijacked experience." I argue that Susanna Siegel's solution to the problem of hijacked experience is incomplete. Then I suggest a way to complete it.
6. "What is the concept of perceptual experience?" I think that it is a natural-kind concept.
5. "Naive realism without fundamental kinds." Naive realism is often expressed as a theory about fundamental kinds. I suggest that this is a mistake.
4. "The conceptual impossibility of phenomenal particularism." By explicating the concept of phenomenal character, I argue that perceived particulars, as well as properties involving perceived particulars, are never phenomenal characters.
3. "Some Aristotelian arguments against perceptual disjunctivism." Kind disjunctivists hold that perceptual experiences do not form a kind. Fundamental kind disjunctivists hold that they do not form a fundamental kind. Using the broadly Aristotelian idea that all perceptual experiences have a common function, I argue that the first view is false and that the second view is, while perhaps true, not especially significant.
2. "Humeanism and the categorical character of epistemic normativity." I show how to square three seemingly inconsistent claims. Roughly put: (1) That basic practical reasons are always fully grounded in desires. (2) That basic practical reasons and basic epistemic reasons belong to a genuine kind. (3) That basic epistemic reasons are never even partly grounded in desires.
1. "Against phenomenal particularism: The missing overlap argument." In my 2014, I argue that external particulars are sometimes parts of experience but are never parts of phenomenal character. Here I clarify and refine that argument.