I am an associate professor of philosophy at Yale-NUS College. My research projects are in philosophy of mind and epistemology.

My main project is to defend the dual awareness theory of perception. On this theory, any genuine perception comprises two importantly different relations:

1. A relation of essence-revealing awareness, which we bear to perceptible and typically external properties. These properties figure in the phenomenal character of the genuine perception.
   
2. A relation of singular awareness, which we bear to perceptible and typically external particulars. These particulars do not figure in  phenomenal character, however.
   

My side project is to offer a reductive theory of normativity, with emphasis on epistemic normativity. On my telic internalist view, any subject's having a foundational reason to φ is grounded primarily in her having a final personal aim of φ-ing. Roughly, whether this aim is conative or cognitive then determines whether the foundational reason is practical or epistemic.

In my spare time, I play modern board games, drink single-malt whisky, and dance salsa.