I have two main research projects and a side project.

My first main research project is in epistemology. Here I have mustered arguments -- which are often broadly metaphysical rather than linguistic -- that favor either contextualism or skepticism. For instance, I argue that contextualism and skepticism are the best theories for using knowledge to explain action, respecting the natural structure of epistemic reality, and accounting for chancy and inductive knowledge.

My second main research project is in philosophy of perception. Here I defend rich pluralism, which says that conscious perception consists of two very different kinds of sensory awareness that are exercised in concert: (i) representational awareness of particulars and (ii) non-representational, partly essence-revealing awareness of sensory qualities.

On the side, I also consider metaphysical questions about the nature of grounding.

Neil mehta

Professor of Philosophy

National University of Singapore

neil.jag.mehta@gmail.com

1a. Best photo -- rating for this cropped version.jpg

Book:

A Pluralist Theory of Perception, MIT Press, 2024. I defend the rich pluralist theory of perception, which is described here.

Peer-reviewed articles:

18. “A natural argument for contextualism,” Noûs, forthcoming. I argue that contextualism is better than standard versions of invariantism at respecting the natural structure of epistemic reality.

17. “In defense of a loose speech theory of knowledge,” Philosophical Studies, 2026. I argue that a skeptical loose speech theory of knowledge is highly charitable, solves a difficult problem about inductive knowledge, and, surprisingly, makes good sense of knowledge norms.

16. “Invariantism, contextualism, and the explanatory power of knowledge,” Noûs, 2023/2024 (online/print). I argue that contextualism meshes better than standard versions of invariantism with the idea that knowledge explains our behavior.

15. “Grounding identity in existence facts: A reply to Wilhelm,” Analysis, 2023. In response to an argument from Isaac Wilhelm, I defend the view that identity facts are grounded in existence facts.

14. “The fragmentation of phenomenal character,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2021/2022 (online/print). I argue that philosophers have unwittingly used the term phenomenal character with several different things in mind.

13. “Naïve realism with many fundamental kinds,” Acta Analytica, 2021/2022 (online/print). I suggest that naive realists are better off without the assumption that any experience belongs to a single fundamental kind.

12. “The common kind theory and the concept of perceptual experience,” Erkenntnis, 2021. I advance a new hypothesis about what the concept of perceptual experience is.

11. “A new argument for the rationality of perception,” Acta Analytica, 2020. I argue that conscious perceptions might be assessable for rationality insofar as they contain categorizations.

10. “Phenomenal, normative, and other explanatory gaps: A general diagnosis,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2017/2019 (online/print). I offer a unified semantic diagnosis of explanatory gaps across many domains.

9. “Can grounding characterize fundamentality?,” Analysis, 2017. I say yes.

8. “On the generality of experience: A reply to French and Gomes,” with co-author Todd Ganson, Philosophical Studies, 2016. Craig French and Anil Gomes have attacked the argument in work 6 below. We defend it.

7. “Knowledge and other norms for assertion, action, and belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015/2016 (online/print). I argue that knowledge sets the standard, not for when assertions, actions, and beliefs are epistemically permissible or epistemically good, but for when they are epistemically successful.

6. “The limited role of particulars in phenomenal experience,” Journal of Philosophy, 2014. I argue that particulars are part of experience without being part of its phenomenal character.

5. “Beyond transparency: the spatial argument for experiential externalism,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 2013. I argue, on the basis of the pervasively spatial character of experience, that at least some phenomenal qualities are instantiated outside the subject's mind.

4. “Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?,”

Philosophical Studies, 2013. I argue that there is not.

3. “How to explain the explanatory gap,” Dialectica, 2013. I offer a physicalist-friendly account of why consciousness generates an explanatory gap.

2. “General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach,” with George Mashour (neuroscientist/anesthesiologist) as second author, Frontiers in Consciousness Research, 2013. We offer a particular theory of why a state is conscious at all and of why it has the particular conscious character that it does.

1. “Exploring subjective representationalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2012. I explore a particular version of the view that the content of experience concerns mind-dependent properties.

Research

Other:

5. “The rationality of perception,” IAI News, 2026 (online). This is a news article, published by the Institute of Art and Ideas in London, summarizing an argument from one of my papers for a popular audience.

4. Précis of my book, A Pluralist Theory of Perception, and replies to commentators, Philosophia, 2026 (online).

3. “A guide to professional philosophy,” self-published, 2025. This is a revised version of my 2016 piece, “A writing guide for professional philosophers.” The original piece has been downloaded more than 5000 times from PhilPapers.org.

2. “Phenomenal character,” encyclopedia entry, Blackwell Companion to Epistemology (3rd edition), 2025.

1. Review of Michael Madary’s book Visual Phenomenology, Philosophical Review, 2019.